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Section 1. Introduction 
The 2007-2011 crisis is a first of all a banking and financial crisis. The crisis was due to 
hazardous and unregulated financial innovations, in a context of financial liberalisation and 
globalisation. Markets were greedy, blind, and volatile. The crisis is also due to the huge 
increase in capital stocks coming from neo-mercantilist economies, raw material exporting 
economies, pension funds, or the wealthiest in emerging and advanced economies, tracking 
the most profitable financial opportunities. Monetary policies allowed private debts to rise, 
financial and housing bubbles, which supported output growth without higher wages or social 
incomes. Last but not least, the world economy became more fragile due to the strategies run 
by mercantilist countries (like China and other Asian emerging economies, Germany, and 
other Northern Europe economies) pursuing competitiveness gains and cumulating external 
surpluses (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2011). 
But the crisis is not due to the rise in public debts and deficits. At the end of 2007, public 
deficit for the OECD as a whole was amounting to 1.3% of GDP only, below the level 
ensuring debt stability. Net public debt amounted to 39% of GDP only.  
The crisis led to a huge rise in government debts and deficits. Initially this rise in debts and 
deficits was due to government measures implemented to support banks, later to the automatic 
fall in tax revenues resulting from lower output growth, and finally to measures taken to 
support output. Starting from mid-2009, markets pretended to have doubts about public 
finance sustainability. They requested higher risk premia on government bonds issued by 
some euro area countries.  
According to financial markets, international institutions, and many mainstream economists, it 
is now of first importance to tackle the issue of public deficits and debts. The problems due to 
the instability and lack of control of the world economy generated by financial globalisation 
have been forgotten.  
Proposals aiming at imposing fiscal policy rules are back to the forefront. But there is no 
evidence that economically relevant rules can be set. The issue is especially acute in the euro 
area, where the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) did not work, and where Member States 
(MS) are under financial market pressure. The ECB and the Northern countries have agreed to 
help Southern countries but wish, as a counterpart, to impose a “New Fiscal Pact”, which 
risks to paralyse fiscal policies and to prevent economic stabilisation. 
The paper has three parts. Section 2 deals with the justifications and specifications for fiscal 
policy rules, either in a classical or in a Keynesian framework. Section 3 provides an analysis 
of fiscal rules experiences. Section 4 discusses EU projects. Section 5 concludes.  
Section 2. Fiscal rules justifications and specifications 
The neo-classical viewpoint 
Fiscal rules proponents argue that governments are not benevolent1. Governments do not aim 
at optimising citizens’ welfare but aim at being re-elected. Each generation is selfish and does 
not care about the situation for future generations. Last, financial markets need to be reassured 
on the ability of governments to service debt. Each of these goals induces a specific rule.  
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Drazen (2004), Wyplosz (2011).  
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According the Leviathan-State theory or the Public Choice theory, each social group asks for 
benefiting from higher public spending without considering that this will imply higher taxes. 
In a non-cooperative equilibrium public expenditure are excessive. Each government agency 
sets the objective of increasing the number of civil servants and means at their disposal, 
without accounting for efficiency and productivity. Governments tend to spend too much in 
order to please their voters, without increasing taxes as a counterpart. They use fiscal policy 
for electoral purposes and not for stabilisation purposes. They do not make the appropriate 
budgetary efforts in good economic times. The social choice between public expenditure and 
taxes is biased because governments can increase public debt. No social or economic 
mechanism can ensure an optimal level of government debt or deficit. Thus public deficits are 
always excessive and this leads to excessive public debts.  
Public deficits are therefore an autonomous cause of macroeconomic unbalances. According 
to the ‘crowding-out’ effect theory, public deficits generate excessive demand, which induces 
higher interest rates and crowds-out private spending. Public deficits reduce savings available 
for investment. The current deficit level leads financial markets to expect large deficits to 
persist and hence further increases in government debts. This raises long-term rates which 
crowds-out private investment. Public deficits are detrimental to capital accumulation and 
therefore to future growth. 
Three objections can be made to this reasoning. The first objection is theoretical. The 
described mechanisms will not play if households are Ricardian. On the one hand, Ricardian 
households are aware that a deficit is equivalent to taxes: they cannot be fooled by the 
government strategy and they have a preference for governments who do not spend much. On 
the other hand, Ricardian households increase their savings in order to offset higher public 
deficits; public debt has no specific unfavourable effect: financing public expenditure through 
taxation or higher indebtedness will be similarly detrimental to output growth. 
The second objection is empirical. These mechanisms of higher interest rates and crowding-
out effects have hardly been observed in reality. From 2002 to 2005 both short and long-term 
interest rates were historically low despite the rise in government deficits in Europe, like in 
the US and Japan. This has also been the case since 2008. Large economies have run large 
government deficits and high public debts with low interest rates at the same time. The rise in 
government debts did not have any impact on interest rate levels or on inflation expectations. 
In 2009, long-term interest rates stood at 1.4% in Japan, 3.3% in Germany and the US, 3.6% 
in the UK, 3.7% in France, i.e. were similar to expected potential output growth (and were 
even clearly below it for the US). It is difficult to assess that such interest rates levels are 
detrimental to investment. 
This theory does not explain why all governments would have suddenly become demagogic 
and increased too much their expenditure in 2002 or in 2009. In the recent past, the rise in 
government deficits was due to fiscal stabilisation rather than to a spontaneous rise in 
expenditure or a spontaneous decrease in tax revenues. It is not obvious that OECD countries 
were characterized, in the recent period, by fiscal indiscipline (contrary to what Debrun and 
Kumar (2007), and Wyplosz (2111) pretend).  
This theory omits that governments do not care only about median voters but also about 
leading classes requesting primarily lower taxation for companies or for themselves and 
trying to promote public spending cuts strategies.  
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In any case, this theory advocates the implementation of a ‘Golden rule of public finances’ so 
as to reduce the governments’ bias for running excessive deficits: current expenditure must be 
financed through taxation, while investment which will benefit future generations may be 
financed though borrowing.2 
It is however difficult to measure investment. How to account for education or research 
expenditure, even more since we have to measure net investment? Besides, it is fair to smooth 
exceptional public spending and tax revenues over all generations.  
This rule can be more precisely defined. Let us assume that a country wishes to maintain a 
public debt level equal its public capital stock. Public debt in real terms will vary as: 
1(1 ) pD D r Sπ−= + − − , where r π−  stands for the real interest rate and Sp is the primary 
government balance. The public capital stock level varies as: 1 1K K I Kδ− −= + − . The equality 
between debt and capital stock requires: 1 1 1( )pS S rD I K Dδ π− − −= − = − − + . Government 
borrowing should equal net public investment plus debt depreciation due to inflation.   
The second argument is intergenerational fairness. A given generation should not consume 
too much at the expense of future generations. But such an ‘excessive consumption’ is 
difficult to assess, while accounting both for demographic developments, productivity growth, 
natural resources and environmental constraints. It is difficult to compare the well-being of 
successive generations. Moreover, in this approach, the criterion cannot bear exclusively on 
the public deficit; private savings need also to be taken into account. According to the ‘golden 
rule of economic growth’, per capita consumption is maximised in a permanent regime if the 
interest rate equals GDP growth. As long as the interest rate does not exceed GDP growth, 
there is no evidence that fairness is not ensured. Intergenerational fairness may thus require a 
fiscal surplus (if the savings ratio is spontaneously too low) or a deficit (if the savings ratio is 
too high).  
The third argument is public debt sustainability. Markets should not believe that a country 
may be a situation where sovereign default is the more profitable outcome. Let sp, stand for 
the primary balance-to-GDP ratio, r% , the interest rate on debt corrected from GDP growth, h , 
the debt-to-GDP ratio. At a given debt ratio, ps rh= % . One should avoid that h , exceeds a 
critical value where the primary balance would be unbearable for populations. The difficulty 
is that r%  depends itself on sustainability perceived by markets. Countries like Greece, Italy, or 
Belgium, have been able to run primary surpluses of 5 percentage points of GDP. If r% = 1%, 
the limit for h  is 500%. If r%  = 5%, the limit comes down to 100%. An indebted country is at 
risk of being trapped in a self-fulfilling spiral, where financial markets require high interest 
rates which leads growth to fall and debts to be unsustainable. This pleads for a debt ceiling, 
but at which level?  
Moreover, it is necessary to make a difference between countries with monetary sovereignty, 
borrowing in their own currency and able to ask for central bank financing (Nersisyan and 
Wray 2011), and non-sovereign countries, borrowing in foreign currency or not able to benefit 
from central bank financing, like euro area countries. The latter do not control their interest 
rate; they may have to pay risk premia; they may default; sustainability is a crucial issue for 
them. The former cannot be insolvent since the Central Bank can provide funding to the 
government. Coordination between fiscal and monetary policies can maintain full 
                                                 
2 This view was developed at the end of the 19th century by Von Stein (1885), Leroy-Beaulieu (1891) and Jèze 
(1896). It can also be found for instance in Musgrave (1939) or Eisner (1989). 
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employment after a negative demand shock. The risk is that a too expansionary fiscal policy 
obliges the central bank to raise interest rates to stabilise inflation, which could make public 
debt unsustainable (Sargent and Wallace 1981, Leeper 1991, Sterdyniak and Villa 1994). This 
cannot occur with the rule: fiscal policy must maintain a satisfactory employment level, while 
enabling the interest rate to be below the nominal growth rate. 
A Keynesian perspective 
From a Keynesian perspective, a certain level of debt and deficit are necessary to ensure that 
demand equals potential output. Public debts and deficits result from the macroeconomic 
situation and are not at the origin of this situation. In times of economic uncertainty or 
entrepreneurs’ pessimism, private demand may be insufficient to maintain full employment. 
The optimal policy consists in cutting the interest rate until demand is sufficiently boosted. 
The advantage of this policy is that it does not increase public debt, it helps capital 
accumulation and lowers the profit rate requested by companies to invest. However, it may 
lead to excessive private companies’ or households’ debt accumulation. It may generate 
financial or housing bubbles. Conversely interest rates cuts may be inefficient in times of 
strong economic depression, when private agents are reluctant to borrow. It may be 
insufficient, especially because there is a floor to nominal and consequently to real interest 
rates: at the end of the 1990’s, the daily interest rate was set at 0 in Japan, which led to a base 
rate of around 3% for commercial banks and to a real credit interest rate of 4.5% (accounting 
for a fall in prices of around 1.5% per year). It may not be implementable in the euro area 
where the common interest rate cannot adjust the different business cycle situations in the 17 
Member States. So the sharp rise in public debts must be related to the lower inflation and 
growth (which prevent the authorities to reduce the real interest rate adjusted for growth) and 
to the introduction of the euro. 
In order to obtain a satisfactory demand level, the government must then accept some public 
deficit. 
If y g d cy r khσ= + + − + , this implies that in the short-run: g d rσ= − +  
Let us note that if this policy is implemented and if stabilisation is perfect, then there is no 
link ex post between the deficit and the output gap. Let us note also that, g, government 
borrowing, is considered as structural according to the OECD or the EC methods, which 
makes no sense.  
In the long run, g = 0 and ( ) /h d r kσ= − −  
The long-term public debt level is not arbitrary, but depends on private agents’ wishes: debt 
must equal desired debt at the optimal interest rate, i.e. the rate equal to growth rate.  
This simple model shows that a fiscal rule like: ( )g g y h hλ μ°= − − −  cannot be proposed, 
since it would not allow for entire stabilisation and since the government cannot set a debt 
target regardless of private agents saving behaviour.  
The public debt level desired by private agents has probably increased during the crisis as 
households wish to hold less risky financial assets and businesses want to be less leveraged. 
Structurally, the ageing of populations implies that safe public assets are increasingly desired.  
Such a deficit necessary to support activity will not crowd out private spending: it will not 
raise the interest rate, since by definition the interest rate is a low as possible. It does not raise 
sustainability issues: if the rise in public debt leads private agents to increase their spending, 
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then the government will be able to cut its deficit accordingly. The government must be ready 
to cut its deficit when private demands resumes. This may require that some public 
expenditure or some revenues cuts are explicitly defined as temporary. 
This ideal scheme requires that the government cuts the public deficit when the economy 
comes close to full employment. The rule should be: the public deficit must be reduced when 
demand tends to become excessive, therefore when inflation tends to accelerate or when the 
central bank has to raise its interest rate above the output growth rate in order to slowdown 
inflation. 
 
Box 1. A Keynesian fiscal policy rule?  
Can a Keynesian fiscal rule be designed? Net public investment (NPI) must be financed through borrowing; 
public deficit should be corrected of debt depreciation induced by inflation (at least for a 2% inflation target and 
a 60% debt target); fiscal policy should be countercyclical: a 1% output gap justifies a 0.75% of GDP public 
deficit, i.e. the automatic effect and slightly more; fiscal policy should be restrictive when monetary policy is 
restrictive too (a fiscal surplus is needed when the interest rate set by the ECB exceeds 4%, the growth ‘golden 
rule’ rate, according to Phelps). Therefore: 
S=-NPI-1.2% + 0.75 output gap +0.5 (i-4) 
According to this reasonable fiscal rule, which ensures that public debt does not exceed public capital stock in 
the long-term, and using the OECD output gap, the French public deficit should amount in 2011 to:   
1.3+1.2 +0.75*3.3+1.25 = 6.2% of GDP. The French public deficit is actually around 5.7% of GDP. 
But this rule does not allow for full stabilisation and does not take in consideration the fact that the output gap 
depends on fiscal policy. 
 
According to this approach, the rise in public debts is a macroeconomic phenomenon with 
two causes: insufficient private demand and too high interest rates. Demand weakness may be 
interpreted as a desire of households to own more financial assets combined with a denial of 
companies to invest. In this situation, it is normal that the government allows public debt to 
increase (if interest rates cannot be lowered): the government stabilises the economy in 
providing the desired public debt. Public deficits increase demand directly and also indirectly 
in raising public debt, owned by households, which tends to increase their consumption. 
Public debt is not a burden for future generations since it has a counterpart in terms of assets 
owned by households. Public debt is only a way to make the economy more liquid. 
Households’ saving has a counterpart in terms in public debt and deficit. One may of course 
regret that it has no counterpart in terms of private firms’ investment and debt, but in the 
context we are considering, companies do not wish to borrow.  
This scheme may come to a halt if households become Ricardian or if markets request 
inappropriate risk premia (Ben Amar and Sterdyniak, 2011). Let us assume for instance, that 
households increase their savings’ ratios because as they get older they wish to own more 
public debt. The government thus increases public debt, but households expect future tax 
increases (they are wrong, of course): they increase their savings further, which obliges the 
government to increase its deficit further. Another example: households increase their savings 
ratio; the government has to increase its deficit to stabilise output, but markets request risk 
premia to offset the debt rise. Here also, the economy may enter into an infernal spiral: higher 
interest rates requested by markets will lead the government to increase its debt to maintain 
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full-employment, which will worry markets, and increase the debt again. In both cases, output 
cannot be stabilised. In both cases, private agents’ defiance towards public debt is a self-
fulfilling prophecy. 
Thus public debt can be reduced only through higher companies’ or households’ borrowing or 
lower savings (owing to reduced uncertainty about the future). Public debt reduction requests 
interest rates to be kept at lowest levels. When government borrowing is of a Keynesian type, 
it makes no sense to advocate a strong cut in government borrowing without explaining how 
the resulting demand deficit will be offset. 
Hence, there are two views on public debts and deficits, like on the need for fiscal rules. 
Fiscal rules proponents may blame Keynesians for opening a Pandora’s box. How to avoid 
demagogic choices, once it is recognised that debts and deficits are allowed? Fiscal rules 
opponents may reply that the fiscal policy adequacy criterion lies on the employment level, 
inflation, interest rates, and not on a priori public debt or deficit levels. They may request 
rules consistent with the macroeconomic stabilisation objective. 
For neo-classical economists, the rise in deficits and public debts in recent years shows that 
rules are needed to avoid this drift. For Keynesians, this rise was necessary and fiscal rules 
would be harmful if they prevent fiscal policy to play. 
Therefore the fundamental question is: why are large public deficits necessary today at the 
world level in order to support demand? Prior to the crisis, four factors contributed to 
insufficient world demand:  
- Many countries implemented neo-mercantilist strategies aiming at current account 
surpluses accumulation: Asian countries learnt the lesson from the 1997 crisis and wish to 
be free of financial markets pressure; China’s growth model is based on exports; some 
countries wish to anticipate the implications of their ageing populations (Japan, Germany, 
Austria, the Netherlands, and Nordic countries). These surpluses add to oil exporting 
countries’ surpluses.  
- Trade globalisation increases the weight of international competitiveness. Each country 
has an incentive to put downward pressure on their wages so as to raise their 
competitiveness. Countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Austria have succeeded in 
lowering substantially the wage share in value added since 2000. Consequently 
consumption has decreased as a share of GDP in these countries. Accounting for 
globalisation and for the interests of leading classes no country implements the relevant 
strategy: supporting output through higher wages and social benefits3. 
- Anglo-Saxon economies have chosen a growth strategy based on wages and incomes 
stagnation for households as a whole and a rise in inequalities. This implies a declining 
consumption trend which was offset by higher households’ borrowing and financial and 
housing bubbles, allowed by real interest rates maintained at low levels. When households 
borrowing reach a paroxysm and when bubbles implode, public debt has to support 
demand.  
- The debt rise does not result from rising public spending, since on the contrary these 
expenditure have decreased as a share of GDP (by 1.4 percentage point for the euro area 
between 1997 and 2007), but from lower tax receipts (by 1.5 percentage point in the euro 
                                                 
3 Strangely, the European Commission and economists in the industrial economies recommend this strategy 
…but for China.  
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area) due to the tax counter-revolution implemented by most governments since 25 years. 
In the name of free movement of people and capital, EU institutions have forbidden 
countries to implement measures needed to protect their tax policies. Hence EU 
governments have used tax competition. Tax and contributions cuts have been intensified 
(on corporate taxation, higher-income households, wealth, employers’ contributions etc…) 
with no positive growth impact. These tax policies have therefore increased social 
inequalities and public deficits. Simultaneously these tax cuts policies were chosen by EU 
institutions, right-wing governments and leading classes with a view to cut tax revenues, 
and pretend afterwards that because of the resulting deficit, public expenditure need to be 
cut.  
Section 3. Fiscal rules experiences  
A fiscal rule4 may be defined as: ‘a fiscal policy constraint which limits the level of some 
variables like deficit, debt or expenditure, either in absolute terms or depending on some 
economic variables’. The implementation of fiscal rules has been strongly advocated by the 
IMF, fiscal rules facilitating fiscal policies surveillance by the IMF (see IMF, 2009).  
In fact, there are different types of rules according to several criteria:  
1. Some rules set permanently what fiscal policy should be: for instance, the structural deficit 
should be nil or equal to net public investment. Other rules set a limit: public deficit should 
not exceed 3% of GDP; debt should not exceed 60% of GDP. Such rules play 
asymmetrically and episodically.  
In the first case, it is difficult to design a rule able to account for all situations. In the 
second case, the rule bites in times of crisis, precisely when output needs to be supported 
by fiscal policy, and not in good times, when running fiscal consolidation would possibly 
not be detrimental to growth. The ceiling is generally arbitrary.  
Some authors suggest automatic fiscal policy rules. Generally, these rules are based on 
magical numbers, unrelated with macroeconomic equilibrium justification (like the target 
of bringing public balance in equilibrium). Some authors recommend to target the debt 
ratio; but how to determine the appropriate level?  
2. Rules can apply to government borrowing, structural balance, debt, expenditure or taxes. 
But government borrowing depends on the cyclical situation; the structural balance is 
difficult to measure. The debt criterion is difficult to fulfil as, in the short run, a restrictive 
policy can increase the debt-ratio (see box 2). Should a rigid rule constrain the social 
choice between public and private expenditure? This has hardly any long-term 
justification. Expenditure rules generate incentives to introduce tax expenditure. The rule 
in terms of tax revenues is often counter-productive; it leads governments to increase 
borrowing rather than raise taxes.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 This paper considers national rules only and does not discuss rules imposed on local government. 
 9
Box 2. The public debt criterion in the short term 
Let us consider an economy in a Keynesian situation. Demand determines output, according to: (1 )y g c t y= + − . 
Debt varies as:  0h h g ty= + − . If g declines by 1, this leads y to fall by 1/1-c(1-t). A restrictive fiscal policy will 
lead the debt- to-GDP ratio to rise if: 0 0/ (1 )(1 )h y c t> − −  
For instance: if c=0.5 and t=0.5, 0 0 100h y= = , cutting the deficit by 1 leads output to fall by 1.33 (from 100 to 
98.68), ex post the deficit will fall by 0.33. Debt will decrease to 99.67. The debt-to-GDP ratio rises from 100% 
to 101%. In the short run, a restrictive policy cannot cut the debt-to-GDP ratio.  
 
3. Rules can be annual, medium-term (debt or deficit targets set at a five-year horizon) or 
long-term (ensuring public finance sustainability). But an annual rule often comes into 
conflict with the economic situation, a medium-term rule allows to postpone efforts and 
may lack credibility, a long-term rule is not very useful: even if a country anticipates a 
strong increase in its pension expenditures, an immediate increase in social contributions is 
counterproductive in a period of insufficient demand. 
Some economists suggest fiscal policy should be run at two horizons: in the short-run, 
expansionary fiscal policies would be allowed; in the longer-term rigid rules would be 
implemented, and announcements like pensions reforms would be made to reassure 
financial markets (Schick, 2010). What would be the credibility of such policies?  
4. Rules may consist in a simple objective set by the government. They may be supervised by 
an external authority (Committees of independent experts, Parliament, Constitutional court, 
EU Commission), which may be entitled to give advices only. This external authority may 
be entitled to impose the fulfilment of the rules. Rules may be written in the Law or in the 
Constitution.  
The first case has the advantage of being soft: the government may change its objective or 
may not fulfil it (sometimes with the only obligation of explaining why). The second case 
raises the issue of the supervising authority: is fiscal policy a technical or a political issue? 
The supervising authority may be given the mandate to give advices, to dialogue with the 
government. Going beyond that, the third case is hardly consistent with democratic 
principles. The fourth case is difficult to implement because all possible events cannot be 
written in the law. If the text is too vague (for instance: fiscal policy should target a 
balanced budget) it may be ineffective. If the text is too precise (for instance, the structural 
balance should be at the equilibrium), it is unenforceable.  
Wyplosz (2002) proposed to establish a national fiscal policy committee of independent 
experts. This Committee would set the public deficit level, while public spending and 
receipts would remain under the responsibility of national governments and parliaments. 
After the ECB’s independence, it would be a new step towards leaving economic policy 
entirely under the responsibility of a technocracy. The Committee’s mandate would be to 
ensure public debt long-run sustainability, while the output stabilisation objective would 
come in second. Unfortunately, the author has difficulty in defining debt sustainability. He 
makes two suggestions: a balanced budget over the economic cycle (which implies a 
public debt at 0% of GDP in the long run), or the stabilisation of the debt-to-GDP ratio in 
the medium run, but he admits that it is impossible to set the appropriate level for this ratio.  
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As concerns monetary policy, the central Bank’s objective is rather clear5 : ensuring low 
and stable inflation rates, the equilibrium unemployment rate theory ensuring that 
monetary policy will lead to the optimal employment level. The fiscal policy objective is 
less obvious: should fiscal policy target full employment or public finances in balance, and 
how to define the latter? This is a political choice which belongs to voters and not to 
experts (Murray and Wilkes, 2009). Wyplosz (2011) recognises that these committees 
should be based on rules, but it does not describe them: will they depend only of fiscal 
variables or will they take account of the macroeconomic situation? The crisis has clearly 
shown that fiscal policy cannot follow rules and must be run by determined and brave 
governments, which will not be the case for experts’ committees. Can we imagine that a 
group of experts would oppose to banks’ financial support or active stabilisation policies in 
2008-2009?  
Other authors, like Fatas et al. (2003) propose a Sustainability Council, i.e. an independent 
panel of experts, who would assess national fiscal policies according to sustainability 
criteria. Their judgment would be made public, so as inform financial markets and the 
general public. The problem is that sustainability is a vague concept, which makes senses 
as a long term constraint only. This means it is difficult to use it to make a judgment on 
fiscal policy run in a given year. It would require judgements on the output gap level, on 
optimal debt, on the need for discretionary fiscal measures. Why would these experts be 
more qualified than others to have an opinion on so difficult issues? The risk is that these 
experts lead markets to have a single opinion and that they exert an excessive influence.  
Other academics simply suggest setting an independent fiscal policy committee in charge 
of assessing macroeconomic projections’ credibility and whether fiscal assessments are 
realistic. Why not? But should there be a single and official Committee? Would not this 
paralyse the democratic debate? One should not engage in a vicious circle: lower than 
expected output growth, therefore a higher than forecast deficit and therefore a more 
restrictive fiscal policy.  
5. How should the position of the economy in the business cycle be accounted for? Should 
the fiscal rule apply to the structural balance (knowing all measurement difficulties)? 
Should discretionary fiscal policy be forbidden? What should a government do after a 
major depressive shock: give up the fiscal rule in order to support growth or try to meet the 
rule at the risk of slowing down the recovery? 
6. The non fulfilment of the rule may lead to no sanction (except by the general public), may 
be subject to fines (in the case of international commitments), may be impossible (if the 
surveillance authority is entitled to constrain the government or if the law is automatic). 
The last cases raise feasibility and democratic issues. In the event of a deep depression, a 
rule may be unenforceable or generate disastrous consequences. For what reasons could a 
group of experts constrain an elected government to run a given policy? 
The German Council of Economic Experts suggested in 2009 that euro area Member States 
make commitments to bring their structural deficit in balance. Any deviation from the path 
would be corrected through an automatic rise in taxes. But this would prevent any 
                                                 
5 Although this objective has become less clear with the financial crisis’ developments. Should the Central Bank 
ensure financial and banking system stability? Should the Central Bank save the financial and banking system? 
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stabilisation fiscal policy; this supposes that the structural balance can be available in real 
time, and that the structural balance equilibrium matches the macroeconomic equilibrium. 
The difficulties we have just mentioned plead for a vague rule, with large flexibility. This 
is how rules worked until recently.   
National rules 
Many countries have introduced in their constitution rules which did not have a real impact. 
Either these rules are vague and not really binding, or they are abandoned when they become 
binding.  
The US has no fiscal rule. There is a public debt ceiling, which can be risen when needed, and 
this may be the opportunity to make medium-term fiscal commitments. Since 1974, the CBO 
has played a significant role in producing reports on the medium-term fiscal outlook and on 
fiscal policy costs. But it does not have any power. The situation is similar in the Netherlands, 
where the CPB plays an important expertise role, in Sweden (with a Fiscal Policy Council), in 
Belgium (High Council of Finance) and in Denmark (Economic Council). 
In Germany, according to the National Stability Pact, governments are not allowed to run 
deficits exceeding the amount of their investments; they should target budgetary positions in 
balance.  
In Spain, the Fiscal stability law from 2004 states that ‘all levels of government should aim at 
budgetary positions in balance’.  
Formally, France already has a fiscal rule. Since July 2008, the Article 34 of the Constitution 
states that: ‘The public finance multiannual guidelines are defined by programming laws. 
They are part of the target of public finances in balance’. This article has had very little 
influence on fiscal policy implementation since then. In times of crisis, multiannual guidelines 
rapidly lose any influence (Table 1). This was the case in 2002 and 2009. Moreover, the target 
of public finances in balance is excessive, as the golden rule allows in the medium term a 
deficit of around 2.5% of GDP. 
Table 1. Public balance targets according to the French Stability programmes  
 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 
J99 -2.9 -2.3   -1.2            
J00  -2.1 -1.7   -0.5           
J01    -1.0 -0.6 -0.4 0.2          
J02     -1.4 -1.3 -0.5 0.0         
J03     -2.8 -2.6 -2.1 -1.6 -1.0        
J04      -4.0 -3.5 -2.9 -2.2 -1.5       
J05        -2.9 -2.2 -1.6 -0.9      
J06        -3.0 -2.9 -2.6 -1.9 -1.0     
J07         -2.7 -2.5 -1.8 -0.9 0.0    
J08          -2.4 -2.3 -1.7 -1.2 -0.6 0.0  
J09           -2.9 -3.9 -2.7 -1.9 -1.1  
J10            -7.9 -8.2 -6.0 -4.6 -3.0
J11             -7.0 -5.7 -4.6 -3.0
 -2.6 -1.8 -1.5 -1.6 -3.2 -4.1 -3.6 -3.0 -2.3 -2.7 -3.3 -7.5 -7.0 -5.6   
 
In the UK, the New Labour government submitted to a vote in the Parliament in 1998 a ‘Code 
for fiscal stability’, embedding two rules: the golden rule for public finances: the government 
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shall be allowed to borrow only to invest over an economic cycle; the sustainable investment 
rule: net public debt should remain at a stable and prudent level, set at 40% of GDP. The 
golden rule has an economic justification since it ensures in theory that public expenditure are 
financed by the generations which benefit from it. It is appropriate from a cyclical view point: 
in times of recession, government borrowing can increase both under the automatic deficit 
and under discretionary measures, as long as this higher borrowing is offset in good economic 
times. It allows governments to borrow to invest, which is particularly necessary for countries 
lagging behind in terms of public investment. The rule prevents governments from reducing 
their deficits through lower investment, which is detrimental to growth. But this rule opens a 
Pandora’s box on public investment definition: should the rule stick to the National accounts’ 
concept or should all expenditure preparing for the future be included, like education and 
research? The rule involves a risk of excessive public investment in bad economic times.  
This golden rule is probably one of the best fiscal rules. However it has three drawbacks: it is 
difficult to implement because it assumes that there is a ‘regular’ economic cycle. What 
should be done if the economic cycle turns out to be irregular? The government has an 
incentive to change business cycle dating in order to have rooms for manoeuvre. The UK 
golden rule is too strict, since we have seen that the appropriate rule is that government 
borrowing equals net public investment augmented by debt depreciation. 
Balassone and Franco (2002) rejected the Golden rule in the name of measurement 
difficulties. The rule implies that statisticians are able to estimate the cyclical part of 
government borrowing (therefore the output gap and its impact on public finances), public 
investment and public capital stock depreciation, in other words four questionable measures. 
But is not it better to use a fair rule, estimated with some lack of precision than to follow a 
wrong rule, estimated with precision? 
A more fundamental criticism is that this rule defines fiscal policy neutrality, cyclical 
neutrality (only automatic stabilisers are allowed to work) and structural neutrality (public 
savings equals public investment). But a government may choose not to be neutral. It may 
wish to run an expansionary fiscal policy in times of subdued activity or a restrictive policy in 
a period a high inflation. It may wish to implement structural measures if it judges that saving 
is too high ex ante (which would require a too low interest rate) or too low (in the light of 
demographic developments). The rule confuses a neutrality criterion with an economic policy 
norm. Nothing guarantees that the fiscal policy needed to reach a satisfying output level in a 
country which does not control its interest rate matches the golden rule.  
The 40% limit for the debt ratio has no justification (net debt stood at 33% of GDP in 1998 in 
the UK). The golden rule ensures on its own that net public debt stands below public capital 
stock.  
No mechanism forces the government to fulfil the Code; the government simply needs to 
explain why it did not fulfil it and how he will stick to it. The rule allowed the government to 
increase substantially public investment spending starting from 2002, which was needed both 
for structural (public equipment was insufficient) and cyclical (to counterbalance lower 
private demand after the burst of the internet bubble) reasons.  
In November 2008, in view of public finance deterioration, the UK government abandoned 
the Code for fiscal stability, announcing that it would restore public finances once the 
economy would recover. Government borrowing rose rapidly, together with net government 
debt (which reached 62.6% GDP in September 2011, excluding financial interventions). This 
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shows clearly that fiscal rules cannot be set as rules ‘for all seasons’, and that they cannot be 
met in times of huge crisis such as the one which started in 2008. 
The Stability and Growth Pact  
Euro area countries are committed to the SGP. This is an example of a fiscal rule enshrined in 
an international Treaty, which raises a delicate issue: can a Treaty resulting from a political 
compromise contain binding economic constraints which are in contradiction with economic 
theory? 
The Pact was based on the assumption that MS domestic fiscal policies could have a negative 
impact on partner countries. But only the risk of an over-expansionary policy was taken into 
consideration, and not the risk of too restrictive policies. The Pact was marginally revised in 
2005, but its initial basic principles remain unchanged. MS should not run higher than 3% of 
GDP public deficits and higher than 60% of GDP public debts. MS are requested to release 
Stability programmes showing 4-year projections for public finances, bringing medium-term 
budgetary positions in balance (a 1% of GDP deficit is allowed for MS with high potential 
growth and low public debt). The budgetary effort must be at least 0.5% of GDP per year 
(measured in terms of primary structural balance, as estimated by the Commission). If debt 
exceeds 60% of GDP, it should be brought down to this value at a satisfactory pace. Once the 
objective of the structural balance in equilibrium is reached then it must be maintained. Only 
the automatic stabilizers are allowed to play, the calculation of the structural balance being 
made by the Commission’s method. The European Commission initiates an Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) when a country exceeds the 3% of GDP deficit (unless this excess is 
temporary) and sets a deadline for the country to bring its deficit below 3% of GDP. MS not 
fulfilling their commitments under an EDP may be subject to fines, but this has never been 
implemented. 
The SGP drawbacks have often been analysed (see, for instance Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 
2003):  
1. The 3% limit makes no sense in times of economic depression. A country particularly hit 
by a recession may need a higher than 3% of GDP deficit to counterbalance a large fall in 
private demand. A priori this will have no negative impact on partner countries since it will 
prevent spill-over effects of a fall in domestic demand. In 2002, Germany was running a 
3.5% of GDP public deficit but the inflation rate stood at 1.4% only and the current 
account surplus at 1.9% of GDP: we cannot see how the German deficit could have a 
negative impact on his partners.  
2. The Pact is blind for two reasons. It can operate only at the trough of the cycle. But 
restrictive measures should be taken only when the economy at the peak of the cycle. The 
Pact does not bite for too virtuous countries. The Pact does not take into account the issues 
of external balance, competitiveness, private debt, financial or real estate bubbles. 
3. The Pact should allow sanctions for countries running excessive public deficits, inducing 
inflationary pressures and excessive deficits, which require the ECB to raise interest rates. 
In fact, countries under an EDP are often countries with low growth and low inflation, and 
which need public deficits to support their growth. Conversely, countries like Spain and 
Ireland have enjoyed strong growth, with inflation, and without any public deficit.  
4. The rationale for a medium-term budget in balance has no clear economic justification. A 
country where private savings are spontaneously too low (high) may need some budget 
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surplus (deficit). It is also reasonable to finance public investment through government 
borrowing and therefore some public deficit is justified. In a situation of relatively low 
private demand, running a government budget in balance may require such a low interest 
rate level that the objective will be out of reach. A deficit kept in permanence at 0% of 
GDP would lead nominal public debt to be stable and constantly declining as a percentage 
of GDP. The debt would reach 0% of GDP at some point. But savers, in particular pension 
funds, need to own public assets, because these are long-term, liquid and safe assets. 
5. In good times, the SGP aims at structural borrowing cuts, but cannot put pressure on 
governments to do so. The 1999-2002 episode showed that the concept of a good economic 
situation is problematic: MS refused to accept the structural unemployment rate floor as 
calculated by the Commission. In a depression, the rule becomes totally unenforceable. 
Moreover, the distinction between a structural and cyclical balance is questionable: where 
should stimulus measures be placed? What about the large revenue falls due to the 
overreaction of corporate and income taxation? Nothing justifies the prohibition of 
discretionary fiscal policies. The SGP constrains fiscal policy to let automatic stabilisers 
play only. But the latter alone cannot stabilise the economy. Let us assume that the tax-to-
GDP ratio is 50% and propensity to consume is 1. Then the multiplier equals 2. If private 
spending falls by 10 ex ante, this will lead output to fall by 20 in the absence of any fiscal 
policy response, and public deficits will rise by 10. If fiscal expansion increases public 
expenditure by 10, this will induce the same rise in deficit but will prevent output from 
falling. Such a policy would be forbidden according to the SGP, based on an implicit and 
wrong theory: automatic stabilisers should be allowed to work, but discretionary 
stabilisation fiscal policies should be forbidden.  
6. Since there is a single interest rate which does not fit domestic specific situations, each MS 
should be allowed to use fiscal policy to achieve a satisfactory output level (corresponding 
to the natural rate of unemployment). If we summarise the EMU functioning 
by: i i iy d g rσ= + − , where iy  is the output gap, id  private demand and ig  public 
spending (assumed to be equal to the public deficit), r is the common interest rate, then we 
should have: i ig d rσ= − + . On the contrary, imposing 0ig =  produces an unsatisfactory 
output level.  
7. The SGP implementation relies crucially on the potential output growth estimate, which is 
problematic in the crisis. According to the Commission method, potential output deviates 
relatively little from actual output, so the deficit is estimated to be mostly structural. As 
Table 2 shows, the 2009 crisis led the Commission to revise substantially its estimates of 
potential output before the crisis. For 2007, the structural deficit increased by 1.2 
percentage points at the euro area level. In 2010, was the requested effort to return to the 
structural balance equilibrium of 5.0 or 2.5 percentage points of GDP? If the target is a 
primary structural position in balance, this was already reached in 2010, if we consider the 
2008 estimates of potential growth. 
The SGP implementation led to strong tensions within the area (Table 3). In 1999-2000, the 
largest countries refused to run restrictive policies, despite strong growth, because they did 
not want to undermine growth while domestic unemployment was still high. So, in the 2003-
2004 economic downturn, deficits rose above the 3% of GDP limit and governments refused 
to undertake restrictive policies which would have deepened the recession. This led to a crisis 
between the Commission and the Council in November 2003. From 2004 to 2007, fiscal 
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positions improved thanks to the recovery and to consolidation policies undertaken in 
Portugal, Germany and Italy, but these countries experienced sluggish growth in that period. 
In mid-2008, no country was under an EDP. However, six countries ran public debts 
exceeding 60% of GDP: countries cannot meet a priori fiscal rules.  
Table 2. Euro area structural balance estimates, according to the Commission 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
GDP growth 1.8 3.2 2.8 0.3 -4.2 1.9 1.5 
Public balance -2.5 -1.3 -0.7 -2.1 -6.4 -6.2 -4.1 
Potential growth* 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.4 0.9 0.8 1.1 
                          ** 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.9   
Output gap* 0.0 1.4 2.5 1.4 -3.7 -2.6 -2.2 
                  ** -0.9 -0.2 0.2 -1.2 -7.3 -7.3 -7.7 
Structural balance* -2.5 -2.0 -1.9 -2.8 -4.6 -5.0 -3.2 
                             ** -2.0 -1.2 -0.7 -1.4 -2.6 -2.5 -0.1 
* Autumn 2011 estimate; ** Spring 2008 estimate. 
Table 3. MS not fulfilling the rules: public deficit/public debt in % of GDP 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Portugal 4.3  3.1 3.4 5.9/63 4.1/64 3.2/68 3.6/72 10.1/83 9.2/93 5.9/108 
France  3.2 4.1/63 3.6/65 3.0/66 /64 /64 3.3/68 7.5/78 7.0/82 5.6/85 
Germany  3.6/60 4.0/64 3.8/66 3.3/68 /68 /65 /66 3.0/73 3.3/83 /84 
Neth.   3.2      5.5/61 5.3/63 3.7/66 
Greece 4.4/104 4.8/102 5.7/97 7.4/99 5.3/103 6.0/106 6.7/105 9.8/111 15.6/127 10.4/143 7.5/153 
Italy 3.1/109 3.0/106 3.6/104 4.4/104 3.3/106 /106 /104 /106 5.3/116 4.5/119 3.9/121 
Spain        4.2 11.1 9.2/60 5.9/68 
Ireland        7.3 14.3/66 32.4/96 10.1/114
Belgium /107 /103 /98 /94 /92 /88 /84 /90 6.0/96 4.2/97 3.6/97 
Austria /67 /66 /66 /65 /64 /62 /61 /64 4.2/70 4.6/72 3.7/74 
 
Fiscal policy rules were not helpful during the crisis. The crisis destroyed the reliability of 
structural balance estimates (see Table 2); it appeared that governments were not controlling 
their deficit levels, due to the over-reaction of revenues. Governments implemented 
discretionary policies; the Commission had to accept them and even to pretend to co-ordinate 
them, forgetting its speeches on their inefficiency. The structural balance objective was 
entirely lost. Government deficits rose, both in their structural and cyclical components: the 
Stability Pact had to be put aside.  
It appeared that public finances deteriorate in times of crisis when fiscal rules can no more be 
applied and are necessarily ‘forgotten’. Public finance deterioration during the crisis is not 
due to over-expansionary policies before the crisis (except for Greece). It results from the 
depth of the recession (which raises the issue of economic instability induced by financial 
globalisation), by banks’ recapitalisation in some countries (Ireland), by the length of the 
crisis (which raises the issue of exit strategies), by the bad functioning of the euro area which 
means that financial markets bet against Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Belgium, where situations 
are not worse than in the US.  
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Section 4. Fiscal rules proposals 
Although the rise in deficits and debts was not due to a drift in public finances, many 
economists and international institutions suggest exit strategies based on fiscal rules, aiming 
at bringing budgetary positions in balance. This raises two issues: how to define this new 
equilibrium? How to ensure that these rules are consistent with macroeconomic requirements?  
Even if the crisis has shown that active fiscal policies are necessary, some countries blame 
inappropriate fiscal policies for current difficulties. Therefore, they wish more binding fiscal 
policy constraints. Should EU governments deprive themselves of weapons which were 
helpful during the crisis?  
In the euro area, the strengthening of the rules is demanded by the ECB, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Finland, as a counterpart of the increased fiscal solidarity needed in face of 
speculation against public debts. The objective is also to re-assure financial markets who 
have understood that public debts in the euro area have become risky assets. But any rule 
raises credibility issues. Too rigid rules implemented simultaneously in Europe will reduce 
GDP growth which will have vicious effects: lower output growth will generate lower tax 
receipts, will increase the debt-to-GDP ratio, government balance targets will not be reached; 
rising unemployment and political and social tensions will increase the fear that the country 
does not stick to the rule and even leaves the euro area.  
Germany: The debt brake  
Germany has introduced a ‘debt brake’ in its Constitution, which forbids any higher than 
0.35% of GDP structural deficit from 2016. The cyclical deficit is estimated according to the 
fragile Commission’s method. According to that estimate, Germany would have run excessive 
structural deficits (above 0.35% of GDP) each year since 1974 (except in 1985 and 1989). But 
how can we consider that a country running higher than 6.5% of GDP current account 
surpluses in 2005-2007 and a 1.5% inflation rate was running excessive public deficits? In 
fact, the debt brake is not more rigid than the SGP rules. But Germany was not fulfilling the 
SGP. 
Derogations can take place, in case of ‘natural disaster or exceptional economic 
circumstances’. They should be agreed in a Parliament vote, with a 2/3 majority. The law 
creates a ‘notional adjustment account’, where the excess over the 0.35% rule (due to cyclical 
developments or poor execution of the budget) are recorded. These excesses will have to be 
amortised either thanks to good economic times or to discretionary policies. The amount of 
this account cannot exceed 1.5% of GDP.  
This rule is satisfactory neither in the short nor in the long term. In the short-term the 
definition of ‘exceptional situations’ will be crucial. In the event of growth deceleration, the 
fiscal policy constraint will depend strongly on the potential output estimate. In 2010, the 
German government deficit stood at 4.3% of GDP. The structural deficit amounted to 3.5% of 
GDP according to the Commission, to 3.3% according to the OECD, to 1.3 % of GDP 
according to us.  
In the long-term, if one considers that Germany may have a potential growth rate of 3% per 
year in nominal terms, then running a 0.35% of GDP deficit would lead the public debt down 
to 12% of GDP in the long-term. Is this realistic? With Germany having imposed on itself 
such a rule, the other EU countries are under market pressure to be as virtuous as Germany.  
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Austria, Spain and Italy 
In 2011, the Austrian government tried to introduce the same ‘debt brake’, but did not obtain 
the agreement of enough political parties. 
In Italy, a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced general government budget, starting 
from 2014, was voted in December 2011 and still needs two votes by June 2012.   
In Spain, a reform of the Constitution incorporating deficits and debt limits required at the EU 
level was approved in September 2011. An organic law, setting precisely the rules, should be 
approved by the Parliament before 30 June 2012. From 2020, the structural deficit should be 
limited to 0.4% of GDP (0.26 for the State, 0.14 for regional governments). Hernandez de Cos 
(2011) writes: “The target variable is the structural deficit, but currently the project does not 
say how it would be defined. The problem of measuring the structural deficit for Spain has 
always been very acute”. 
UK: an independent office 
In 2010, the UK introduced an independent Office for Budget Responsibility, in charge of 
producing the macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts and of assessing the government 
patrimonial accounts. In 2011, the government set the objective of bringing the structural 
current government borrowing in balance in a five-year period, i.e. the golden rule with the 
problems mentioned earlier. The OBR has to assess if the fiscal policy implemented will 
reach this objective (with a higher than 50% probability). What will the government do if 
active fiscal policy is needed in 2016? He will fortunately not be constrained by the 2011 
programme. Hence, the medium-term commitment is not so binding.  
A French-type rule?  
In March 2010, a Commission was appointed with the mandate of recommending a public 
finances rule. The report was released in June (see Camdessus, 2010).  
From the beginning, the Commission chose not to consider wise rules like the ‘golden rule’ or 
the stabilisation of the debt-to-GDP ratio, and suggested instead an unenforceable rule: the 
equilibrium of the structural balance, which forbids discretionary measures and imposes a too 
strong constraint in the medium term. There was however no macroeconomist among the 
members of the Commission, and stabilisation issues were forgotten.  
The Commission suggested that each new government commits himself by law on a 
programme reducing structural deficits and on a date at which the structural balance would be 
reached.   
In March 2011, the French government proposed a complicated Constitutional law project. 
Each government will have to commit themselves in a multiannual public finance law, which 
should cover 3 years at least and would include, year by year, a public spending ceiling and an 
amount of new measures in terms of receipts (independently of the conjuncture). Higher than 
announced spending would be allowed only if combined with a similar rise in receipts. The 
government would have to commit initially on a fixed scenario including each year cuts in the 
structural deficit (public expenditure less receipts corrected from the conjuncture). The 
government would have to set a date at which the structural balance would be reached. The 
Constitutional Council would be entitled to amend a finance law if the latter was not in 
conformity with this multiannual public finance law, i.e. if it involved a lower fiscal effort. 
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This project raises several difficulties:  
- It commits future governments to target public finances in balance. 
- It continues to be based implicitly on a potential output growth path, needed to estimate 
the effort in terms of expenditure and of the trend in receipts.  
- It requests the Constitutional Council to assess whether the fiscal effort matches well the 
multiannual public finance law, whereas the measurement of this effort depends on 
arguable assessments of potential growth, on the impact of output level on tax revenues, on 
the impact of the new measures. 
- What will happen if output growth is much weaker than planned in the ‘multiannual 
law’? In principle, the government should not be entitled to implement discretionary 
stabilisation measures. The Law would then constrain fiscal policy to let automatic 
stabilisers play only. But the latter alone cannot stabilise the economy. Let us assume that 
the tax-to-GDP ratio is 50% and propensity to consume is 1. Then the multiplier equals 2. 
If private spending falls by 10 ex ante, this will lead output to fall by 20 in the absence of 
any fiscal policy response, and public deficits will rise by 10. If a fiscal expansion 
increases public expenditure by 10, this will induce the same rise in deficit but will prevent 
output from falling. Such a policy would be forbidden according to the law proposal. The 
proposal is based on an implicit and wrong theory: automatic stabilisers should be allowed 
to work, but discretionary stabilisation fiscal policies should be forbidden. At the end of 
2008, the IMF, the G20 and the European Commission requested countries to implement 
such policies. Should these policies be two years later?  
In fact, the Constitutional project is written in such a way that the government will have the 
possibility ask the parliament to vote a new ‘multiannual law’ before voting the budget law. 
The risk is that it complicates further the budgetary process, even more if the multiannual law 
comes in addition but does not replace the Stability programme that France has to send to EU 
authorities each year.  
The experience of the SGP has shown that it is useless to ask MS to announce a trajectory for 
public finances independently of the cyclical situation. In November 2007, the French 
government announced that the structural deficit would be cut down to 0.6% of GDP in 2011. 
In January 2010, the structural deficit target had moved to 6% of GDP. Obviously, this rise in 
deficit was needed in the crisis. But what would have happened if the budget had been 
constrained by a ‘multiannual law’ passed in 2008? Does the French government consider it 
was wrong to support output in 2009, and not to be constrained to remain inactive?  
Some mainstream economists (like Boone and Pisani-Ferry, 2011) think that France should 
make more budgetary efforts: they request that the ‘multiannual law’ at the beginning of the 
Parliament legislature, determines ‘the fiscal policy main parameters over a five-year period’, 
as if a rigid economic policy could be run without accounting for cyclical or structural 
developments. They request the ‘correction of past deviations’: in 2013 or 2014, excessive 
deficits from 2009 or 2010 should be corrected without accounting for the effective cyclical 
circumstances these years. An ‘independent public finance council’ should be settled, and 
would be in charge of evaluating the fiscal policy implemented.   
This project was adopted by the French National Assembly and the Senate, but did not obtain 
a sufficient majority. It will not be voted by the Congress.  
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However, the French government has made a clear commitment to meet from now on the 
deficit public reduction path enshrined in the budget law (6% of GDP in 2011, 4.6% in 2012 
and 3% in 2013), independently of cyclical developments. Hence, announcing that GDP 
growth will in 2012 be 1 percentage point lower than anticipated a few months ago should 
translate into austerity measures amounting to 0.5% of GDP which should dampen output 
growth further. On the whole, accounting for a 0.5 sensitivity of government borrowing to 
GDP and a multiplier equal to 1, the additional austerity measures should amount to 1 
percentage point of GDP and GDP should fall by 2%. 
A strong EU pressure 
The EC’s legislative proposals on strengthening the SGP, the ‘Euro Plus Pact’ and the ‘new 
fiscal rule’ aim at constraining all euro MS to introduce binding fiscal rules in their 
constitution. The EU authorities did not learn the lessons from the disastrous euro area 
management before the crisis. This management was focusing on rigid fiscal rules and not on 
a precise coordination of macroeconomic strategies, and this has increased disparities within 
the EU in a weak growth context (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2011).  
The debt crisis strengthened the weight of proponents of automatic and without economic 
rationale fiscal rules. These proponents can now rely on financial markets’ threat, on the need 
to reassure financial markets, on Germany’s weight, which wishes to be paid for increased EU 
solidarity through strengthened SGP rules. The Greek crisis is way to hide the financial crisis 
under the carpet.  
The proponents of strict rules point to the threat of financial markets and rating agencies. If a 
country did not include such rules in their constitution they would lose their precious AAA. 
Financial markets would lend at reasonable rates only to countries committing not to have to 
borrow. On the one hand, countries cumulating huge currency reserves (like China, and oil 
producing countries), pension funds, and insurance companies wish to own huge public assets 
amounts. On the other hand, they refuse to lend to countries which need to borrow, at least 
without high risk premia. They refuse that their liquid assets accumulation has a counterpart 
in terms of debt. Such contradictory demands will paralyse the world economy.  
On 29 September 2010, the Commission proposed a set of six legislative proposals aiming at 
strengthening economic governance: 
- The proposals keep the 3% of GDP limit for deficits, the medium term objective of 
budgetary positions in balance, and the constraint for countries running a structural deficit 
to cut it by at least 0.5% of GDP per year. No lesson is drawn from past experience.  
- Countries will face sanctions if public spending increases more rapidly than prudent 
GDP growth (unless this is offset by a rise in taxation or if the country runs a budgetary 
surplus).  
- Countries will face sanctions if they do not cut their structural deficit by 0.5 
percentage point per year. 
- Countries running a higher than 60% of GDP debt ratio will be under an excessive 
deficit procedure if the debt ratio does not fall by 1/20 per year of the gap between the 
effective debt and the 60% reference value. But it is almost impossible to prevent the debt 
ratio to rise in times of economic slowdowns. This new rule is pro-cyclical: it strengthens 
the constraint on deficits in slow growth periods. For a country having a debt of 90% of 
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GDP and a 2% annual inflation rate, the public deficit will have to be below 2% of GDP if 
GDP grows by 2%; the deficit will need to be below 1% if GDP grows by 1% only.  
- Guilty countries (countries with too rapid rises in public spending, countries not 
cutting their structural deficit, or not complying with an EDP) will have to make a deposit 
of between 0.2% and 0.5% of GDP, which will possibly be converted into a fine if 
requested measures are not implemented.  
- The Commission wishes to impose countries to introduce EU rules in the fiscal 
frameworks (the 3% and 60% limits, the medium-term target of budgetary positions in 
balance) and to implement a surveillance of these rules by an ‘independent budgetary 
institution’.   
- The qualified majority will now be needed to oppose measures and sanctions 
recommended by the Commission, this being expected to ensure the automaticity of 
sanctions.  
The Commission’s proposals undermine MS autonomy, and force them to fulfil rules lacking 
rationale; they reduce their ability to stabilise their economies. It will increase further tensions 
between the Commission and the MS. Expert Committees are given the mandate of 
monitoring fiscal policy, although the crisis has clearly shown that strong and determined 
policy responses are needed.  
The proposal (the six-packs) was voted by the European Parliament while media remained 
silent and citizens entirely uninterested. The Parliament worsened the text: the Commission 
can sanction automatically a country not fulfilling the forecast path for deficit reduction.  
According to the Euro plus pact, each MS should introduce in their budgetary framework or 
their Constitution a fiscal rule similar to the SGP, the Commission being in charge of 
verifying this equivalence.  
In October 2011, the ECOFIN council specified that MS under an EDP, i.e. currently almost 
all euro area countries, will have to meet their budgetary targets independently of economic 
circumstances, in other words to implement pro-cyclical fiscal policies. 
On December 9th 2011, the European Council, under Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy 
leadership, proposed a ‘new fiscal compact’, which merely repeats the already adopted 
framework. Each country should include in its Constitution a rule limiting the structural 
public deficit to 0.5% of GDP and providing a mechanism for automatic correction, if the 
ceiling is breached. The EU Court of Justice will verify that the rule complies with the 
European rules. Countries should reduce their deficit, according to a schedule proposed by the 
Commission. Countries under an EDP should submit their budgets and structural reform 
programmes to the Commission and the Council, which will give their advice and monitor 
budget implementation. A qualified majority of euro area governments will be required to 
oppose the sanctions for countries breaching the 3% ceiling or not complying with 
instructions given by the Commission. This project is dangerous in economic terms as it 
imposes an arbitrary public deficit rule; it imposes quasi-automatic fiscal policies; it prohibits 
any discretionary policy to support activity. MS will lose their fiscal autonomy. Implementing 
this Pact would be a serious setback for democracy in Europe. 
In fact, the aim is to impose strong commitments to convince Germany and other Northern 
countries to accept more financial solidarity in Europe, to persuade the ECB to intervene more 
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strongly by buying public debts. But until now Germany and the ECB are not convinced they 
should engage in this strategy. 
Last, some economists and even ministers in Germany or the Netherlands requested that a 
country not fulfilling the SGP may be condemned by the European Court of Justice. Fiscal 
policy would be submitted to the judiciary power. The ECB President proposes that a 
Commissioner be responsible for euro area MS public finances and be allowed to control MS 
budgets. We therefore observe the implementation of binding and absurd fiscal rules, 
inconsistent with macroeconomic governance needs. This is a failure in the current EU 
framework: better economic policies coordination is essential, but a numerical control of 
public deficits levels is neither economic policy coordination, nor an optimal rule. 
Fiscal rules and markets 
In 2011, most euro area economies appear to be close to primary structural balance, in other 
words their debt would remain stable if they were borrowing at an interest rate equal to output 
growth (Table 4). This is not the case for Japan, the US, and the UK. Besides, euro area 
countries suffer from a much higher interest rate than countries outside the euro area, with 
smaller imbalances. There is a specific cost for euro area countries.  
Table 4. Countries’ situation in 2011 
 Current 
account, 
% of GDP 
Public 
deficit,  
% of GDP 
Public debt, 
% of GDP 
Average 
growth, 
2011 and  
12 
Grade, 
over 20 
Primary 
structural 
balance, 
% of GDP 
10-year 
interest 
rate, 
December 
Finland 3.0 -1.4 54 2.5 18.6 0.5 2.7 
Germany 5.5 -1.7 84 1.9 17.1 0.0 2.15 
Austria 3.1 -3.6 74 2.2 16.8 -0.4 3.2 
The Neths.  7.2 -3.8 66 1.25 15.9 -1.3 2.55 
Belgium 1.0 -3.8 97 1.7 12.3 0.3 4.55 
France -2.6 -5.8 85 1.2 11.1 -1.4 3.3 
Spain  -2.9 -6.5 68 0.5 10.7 -0.9 5.75 
UK  -1.5 -8.8 86 1.15 8.9 -4.4 2.15 
US  -3.7 -9.1 98 1.75 8.2 -6.8 2.05 
Italy -4.1 -3.7 121 0.3 7.5 2.3 6.35 
Japan  2.6 -8.3 236 0.9 7.1 -4.9 1.0 
Ireland 3.7 -11.3 114 0.0 7.1 -2.2 8.2 
Portugal -7.8 -6.8 101 -1.5 5.4 0.6 13.0 
Greece -8.6 -8.2 153 -4.2 3.2 2.6 34.5 
 
Since 1945, no industrial country defaulted on its public debt. Public debt was a safe asset, 
since governments were borrowing in their own currency and could always ask for central 
bank financing. Industrial countries benefited from ‘monetary sovereignty’. This is always the 
case today for Japan, US and UK (table 5). It is basically absurd that rating agencies rate 
governments with monetary sovereignty, as if they could possibly default. Countries with 
monetary sovereignty should abandon their AAA: by nature, their debt has no risk since it is 
guaranteed by the monetary power of their Central banks. 
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Euro area countries have lost their ‘monetary sovereignty’: according the EU Treaty, the ECB 
is not allowed to finance governments; there is no solidarity between MS. Financial markets 
spotted this in mid-2009. Since then, an out-of-control speculation started on the more fragile 
countries: Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and then by a domino effect, Italy, Spain, and even 
Belgium. Greece, Ireland and Portugal are brought back to a situation of developing 
economies in the past: their debts have become risky assets, facing substantial risk premia; 
they have to obey the Caudine Forks of the IMF.  
This financial markets’ game may entirely paralyse fiscal policy. When a country has 
monetary sovereignty, the central bank may cut its interest rate down to the lowest level and 
be committed to keep it durably low. The government increases its deficit, but the low level of 
interest rates avoids public debt to increase under a ‘snowball effect’; it leads the exchange 
rate to fall, which supports output. The debt guarantees through monetary creation implies 
that there is no default risk, hence no reason for being obliged to reassure markets in 
permanence. The central bank will keep interest rates low in times of depression and this will 
ensure fiscal policy effectiveness. Fiscal policy does not have to care about markets. This is 
still the strategy of the US.  
In the euro area the risk is that a country may be unable to increase its deficit under the fear 
that government debt will be downgraded by rating agencies and that interest rates increase. 
Countries have therefore no choice but beauty contests, in order to appear as virtuous as 
Germany in the markets’ eyes. Their fiscal policy becomes ineffective and hence their 
cyclical situation out of control. Public debt becomes a permanent risk factor, since 
governments are at the mercy of markets’ animal spirits. Any economic policy would have to 
be assessed while accounting for markets’ opinion. But markets do not have any particular 
macroeconomic skills. They impose austerity measures in depressed times and afterwards 
complain about insufficient output growth. This is how they proceed nowadays for the euro 
area in general, for Italy and Greece in particular. They favour free-market reforms, such as 
reducing social protection or the number of teachers.  
The default risk must be nil for countries so that they can keep their ability to run economic 
policies. The euro area therefore has to choose between disappearing or getting reformed in 
order to guarantee MS government debts; governments would find their ‘monetary 
sovereignty’ again. EU public debts should become safe assets again, with low interest rates 
but entirely guaranteed (by EU solidarity and fundamentally by the ECB). This is the only 
way to maintain fiscal autonomy, which is necessary due to disparities in Europe and to the 
loss of the monetary instrument and of the exchange rate for each MS.  
The euro area framework was not appropriately designed initially, especially as concerns the 
trade off between ‘fiscal policy autonomy/single currency/monetary sovereignty’. The joint 
guarantee creates a moral hazard problem, since each country may increase its debt with no 
limit, but the absence of guarantee leaves the door open to financial markets always ready to 
speculate against some countries. The guarantee cannot be restricted to countries fulfilling the 
automatic fiscal rules (lacking rationale and not enforceable); it should be automatic and total. 
The compromise would be that debts are totally guaranteed for countries agreeing to submit 
domestic fiscal policies to a coordination process. Such coordination should aim at reaching 
full-employment. The coordination process should reach unanimity. The Treaty should 
include a scheme for a country that would implement an unsustainable policy, incompatible 
with the coordination decision; in this case, the new debt of the country would not be 
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guaranteed, but this should never occur. Euro area countries not having to reassure markets 
anymore, could implement differentiated but coordinated strategies, setting themselves a main 
target of bringing their economy to a satisfactory employment level, consistent with a stable 
inflation.  
Section 5.  Conclusion  
Due to the crisis, there is probably a need for a more transparent fiscal policy management: 
governments should state clearly their output growth target, temporary expansionary measures 
should be clearly announced as such, the structural balance should not include temporary 
expansionary measures; the public deficit target should be explicit, but this target can only be 
the golden rule and should be assessed accounting for the macroeconomic context.  
Fiscal rules proponents forget that fiscal policy cannot be managed on its own, under arbitrary 
criteria. Fiscal policy should set itself the objective of maintaining (or reaching) a satisfactory 
employment level albeit allowing inflation and interest rates to remain at satisfactory levels. 
Government deficit and debt should be derived from this objective.  
The emergency today is not to increase public finance discipline by cutting blindly deficits 
but to question economic developments (financial globalisation, the wish of many countries to 
accumulate surpluses, the change in incomes distribution), which make these deficits 
necessary to support output (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2011).  
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